

# THE SOVIET AND COMMUNIST BLOC DEFAMATION CAMPAIGN

Mr. PRICE asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in the body of the Record and to include therein a paper entitled "The Soviet and Communist Bloc Defamation Campaign."

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Speaker, a major program to defame and discredit U.S. departments and agencies having responsibilities for national security has been conducted by the Soviet and Communist bloc since 1948. How it operates is explained in a paper, "The Soviet and Communist Bloc Defamation Campaign," which I submit for printing in the Record. Main targets are the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The paper follows:

## THE SOVIET AND COMMUNIST BLOC DEFAMATION CAMPAIGN SYNOPSIS

1. The Soviet and Communist bloc effort to defame and discredit U.S. departments and agencies that have major responsibilities for national security has been underway since 1948. A major program is aimed at the Central Intelligence Agency and has grown markedly in quantity and intensity since the establishment of the KGB Department of Disinformation in 1959. This program now produces between 350 and 400 derogatory items annually. Communist press and radio attacks against the Agency reveal an increased sophistication in recent years. In addition, many Communist-inspired books and pamphlets which attack the existence, purposes, and status of CIA, and reflect a substantial budget for this activity, have appeared throughout southeast Asia, Africa, and the Near East.

2. CIA, in its intelligence role, is feared by the Soviets for its responsibility and ability to penetrate and unmask Communist conspiracies against democratic institutions. By striking at CIA, the attack also centers on the intelligence community with particular thrust against the FBI and Mr. J. Edgar Hoover. The objective of the overall program is to achieve the destruction, breakup, and neutralization of CIA. A basic requirement of Soviet policy and a major objective of the Soviet intelligence services is the destruction of effective security collaboration among the non-Communist countries in order to carry out Soviet long-term strategic plans for subversion, political upheavals, popular fronts, and the eventual political isolation of the United States.

3. Defamation and forgery operations are conceived, directed, and perpetrated by a single organization located outside the target areas which makes use of local Communist or pro-Communist propagandists and of co-operating Communist bloc intelligence and security services. Although such undertakings are the products of the disinformation department of the KGB, known as department D, which is headed by Gen. Ivan Ivanovich Agayants, they are reviewed and passed on by the Soviet leadership. The operations of the Soviet Disinformation Department have been successful thus far in stimulating a wide replay in Africa, southeast Asia, the Middle East and even in the United States. CIA will continue to be the prime target of Soviet disinformation and defamation operations.

## SOVIET AND COMMUNIST DISINFORMATION

4. It is an established Soviet principle—now embraced by all members of the Communist bloc—that a large percentage of subversive activity be devoted to the planning and conduct of disinformation (dezinformatsiya) operations which mold, divide, and mislead other governments or leaders, and cause them to adopt policies and actions which are ultimately advantageous only to the Soviet Union. The Soviet leadership has charged the Soviet State Security Service, the KGB,

to place very great emphasis, both organizationally and operationally, on disinformation activity. Communist bloc services, in turn, are playing their part in this work.

5. What are disinformation operations? "Dezinformatsiya," in Soviet terminology, is false, incomplete, or misleading information that is passed, fed, or confirmed to a targeted individual, group, or country. "Propaganda," as it is defined by free world students, may be used as a support element of dezinformatsiya, but propaganda per se lacks the precision and bite of disinformation.

6. Soviet disinformation activity is planned and directed by a specialized department of the Soviet State Security Service. This KGB department, which was created to intensify Soviet disinformation activity, is headed by Gen. Ivan Ivanovich Agayants, a senior, professional intelligence officer with long experience and well-developed agent and political contacts in Western Europe, especially in France, where he served under the name Ivan Ivanovich Avalov. At one time in France he controlled the French spy Georges Pasques who was sentenced to life imprisonment on July 7, 1964.

7. The assignment of Agayants to take over the disinformation task indicates the high priority that the then Chairman of the Presidium, Nikita Khrushchev, gave to the campaign against American leadership and activity. Chairman Kossygin and First Secretary Brezhnev have made no changes in that program. Department D is still directly tied into the Presidium in the planning of its work.

8. Agayants' department is staffed by an estimated 40 to 50 geographical and functional specialists in Moscow alone; it avails itself directly and peremptorily of the worldwide resources, manpower and operations, of the Soviet security apparatus. The purposes, broadly stated, of the disinformation department are to:

(a) Destroy the confidence of the Congress and the American public in U.S. personnel and agencies engaged in anti-Communist and cold war activity.

(b) Undermine American prestige and democratic institutions and alienate American leadership with NATO governments and other non-Communist countries, thereby contributing directly to the breakup of the NATO alliance.

(c) Sow distrust and create grounds for subversion and revolt against the United States in the Western Hemisphere and among the new nations of Africa and Asia.

These purposes and objectives, it must be emphasized, have been established by the highest elements of party and government in the Soviet Union.

9. Personal experiences with this program have been described by officers who have left the Soviet system and are now in the United States. One of these—Alexander Kaznacheev, who served in Burma as an information officer—described the program and the process in a recent personal memoir:

"Articles were originated in KGB headquarters in Moscow—for example, about alleged American support of the Indonesian rebels, frequent American violations of Cambodia's sovereignty, subversive activity of Japan in the region, etc. The articles were received from Moscow on microfilm and reproduced as enlarged photo-copies at the Embassy. It was my job to translate them into English. Some other members of Vozny's group would then arrange through local agents for the articles to be placed in one of the Burmese newspapers, usually pro-Communist-oriented. The newspaper would

"It will be recalled that Khrushchev, during his U.S. visit in September 1959, engaged in more than one discussion at the White House and during his tour designed to destroy confidence in American intelligence. His statements and remarks made during interviews, it is known, were prepared by KGB agents. It was my job to translate them into English. Some other members of Vozny's group would then arrange through local agents for the articles to be placed in one of the Burmese newspapers, usually pro-Communist-oriented. The newspaper would

"Ivan Mikhailovich Vozny, a KGB officer, was head of the political intelligence section in the Soviet Embassy in New York City.

translate the article into Burmese, make slight changes in style, and sign it from 'Our special correspondent in Singapore,' for instance. Upon publication of such an article, the illegitimate creation of Soviet intelligence receives an appearance of legitimacy and becomes a sort of document.

"But the work was not yet finished. I then took the published article and checked it against the original Russian text. I noted all the changes and variations made by the newspaper, and wrote down in Russian the final version of the article. This final version was then immediately sent back to Moscow, this time through Tass channels."

"The last stage of this grandiose forgery was under the special care of the Soviet Information Bureau, Tass, Radio-Moscow, the Soviet press, and Soviet diplomatic representatives abroad. It is their duty to see that the material is republished and distributed in all countries of the region as if they were genuine documents which had appeared in the Burmese press."

10. Although the KGB is able to fabricate in Moscow whatever material is needed for its disinformation operations, it has been making more and more use of material published in the West, some of which had been planted there by earlier disinformation activities. An examination of the books and articles cited in any of the anti-CIA pamphlets reveals extensive use of Western source material, often taken out of context. The most recent Soviet articles on the Agency are exclusively "documented" from Western books, articles, and newspapers.

11. In the 58 pages of "CIA Over Asia," a slanderous booklet published in Kanpur, India, in 1962, for example, American newspapers and magazines are cited 11 times, periodicals of other Western or neutral countries 15 times. The fact that some references are made to Communist organs is obscured by repeated citations from reputable American publications.

12. A study of Soviet disinformation shows that the Soviets are engaged in an impressive research project to collect and process information and speculation about American intelligence and security services that appears in Western publications and newspapers. This study also has confirmed the deep interest of the Soviet services in the development and milking of Western journalists. Americans figure prominently among these

13. The measure and depth of department D's activity against the CIA may be judged from a single episode. A booklet attacking the former Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Allen W. Dulles, entitled "A Study of a Master Spy" (Allen Dulles), was printed and distributed in London during 1961, and has since been reprinted. The ostensible author was a prominent maverick Labor Member of Parliament, one Bob Edwards, who was supposedly assisted in the effort by a British journalist. It is now known that the manuscript was researched in Moscow by a senior KGB disinformation officer, Col. Vasily Sitnikov, and then served up for final polish and printing in the United Kingdom. Mr. Dulles himself discussed this episode on a TV roundtable on March 20, 1964:

"Mr. HANSON BALDWIN. Well, that brings up, too, doesn't it, the question of disinformation? What kind of disinformation is being distributed by the Soviets today? Can you explain this, Allen?

"Mr. DULLES. Well, I have here right in my hand—

"Mr. BALDWIN. And what is disinformation, anyway?

"Mr. DULLES. Well, this is it. Here's 'A Study of a Master Spy.' Here's a booklet that was written about me. Now, it bears on the outside here, you see, 'A Study of a Master Spy.' I won't give you the names of the authors, but one of them is a member of the legislature of a very great, friendly country. I am the author of this—I am the 'master spy'—I have found out recently after certain

Alexander Kaznacheev, "Inside a Soviet Embassy" (New York, 1962), pp. 12-173.